Whatcott: the redaction of the Taylor dissent

INTRODUCTION

In its 2013 Saskatchewan v. Whatcott[1] decision, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the hate speech prohibition contained in section 14(1)(b) of The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.[2]

The impugned provision makes it illegal to publish printed material that exposes or tends to expose any person or class of persons to hatred on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. After undergoing a Charter[3] analysis, the SCC held that section 14(1)(b) of the Code infringes sections 2(b) freedom of expression and 2(a) freedom of conscience and religion but that this infringement is demonstrably justified under section 1. The SCC has again shown itself unwilling to defend a broadly construed constitutional right to freedom of expression.

But in the end, what is surprising about the Whatcott decision is not the result. It’s surprising because it is unanimous.


PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2001 and 2002, William Whatcott, a self-proclaimed anti-gay activist produced and distributed a variety of offensive flyers in Regina and Saskatoon. The flyers contained his opinions regarding homosexuality. Four recipients of Whatcott’s flyers filed complaints with the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal (Tribunal) alleging that the flyers promoted hatred against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation.

The Tribunal held that four of Whatcott’s flyers contravened section 14(1)(b) of the Code. Section 14(1) reads:

14(1) No person shall publish or display, or cause or permit to be published or displayed, on any lands or premises or in a newspaper, through a television or radio broadcasting station or any other broadcasting device, or in any printed matter or publication or by means of any other medium that the person owns, controls, distributes or sells, any representation, including any notice, sign, symbol, emblem, article, statement or other representation:

…

(b) that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground.

In 2007, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench affirmed the Tribunal’s decision.[4] In 2010, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (SKCA) allowed the appeal concluding that none of Whatcott’s flyers satisfied the high legal standard set for “hatred” by the SCC’s jurisprudence and that Whatcott therefore had not violated section 14(1)(b).[5] At no time were the constitutional arguments advanced by Whatcott successful in any of these decisions.


THE 1990 TAYLOR DECISION

Both Saskatchewan courts recognized they were bound by the SCC’s seminal Canada v. Taylor[6] decision. It was the definition of “hatred” as set out in Taylor that the SKCA held Whatcott’s flyers failed to satisfy.

Taylor concerned the constitutionality of the hate speech prohibition in section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.[7] In that decision, the SCC found that section 13(1) is aimed only at expression involving feelings of an “ardent and extreme nature” and “unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification.”

John Ross Taylor publicly distributed cards inviting calls to a phone number that was answered by a recorded message. The Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) received complaints about the anti-Semitic content in the message. The CHRC held that the messages were discriminatory under section 13(1) and ordered Taylor to cease the practice. Taylor challenged the constitutionality of section 13(1), arguing that it violated his freedom of expression.

Section 13(1) was repealed in 2013, but in 1990 it read:

It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

On appeal to the SCC, four of the seven justices upheld section 13(1). In the years following, the Taylor decision was severely criticized—fuelled in no small part by the dissenting opinion of Justice McLachlin (as she was then).

In her reasons, McLachlin, J. canvassed many of the problems with hate speech prohibitions as contained in human rights legislation. For instance, there are problems of subjectivity. The word “hatred” is an ambiguous, emotionally charged term indicating a psychological state and it is capable of a wide range of meanings amongst different people. Lacking any definition in the statute and arguably incapable of sufficiently precise definition, it must inevitably function as a proxy for the personal and political views of the judiciary.

Also, since the hate speech prohibition in section 13(1) lacks any intent or harm requirement, it is entirely possible that someone be punished under this provision for acts that were never intended to be discriminatory and that caused no one any harm or actual discrimination.

The provision’s inherent subjectivity and overbreadth make it impossible to know beforehand whether any particular expression is illegal or not. And as a result, the prohibition produces a chilling effect on the free expression of ideas.

In the years following Taylor, McLachlin, J.’s dissent seemed to be winning broad support.

In December 2007, Maclean’s magazine and author Mark Steyn were the subjects of human rights complaints by Mohamed Elmasery of the Canadian Islamic Conference before the Canadian, Ontario, and British Columbia Human Rights Tribunals for publishing 18 allegedly “Islamophoic” articles. And between 2006 and 2008, Ezra Levant was the subject of an Alberta human rights complaint made by Syed Soharwardy of the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada because Levant published the infamous Jyllands-Posten cartoons of Muhammed in his Western Standard magazine. None of these complaints were successful, but both Steyn and Levant became out-spoken critics of hate speech prohibitions as contained in human rights legislation—with Levant publishing a book on the topic.[8]

In 2008, Professor Richard Moon of the University of Windsor’s Faculty of Law released a report[9] commissioned by the CHRC on section 13 recommending that the hate speech prohibition be repealed and that,

We must develop ways other than censorship to respond to expression that stereotypes and defames the members of an identifiable group and to hold institutions such as the media accountable when they engage in these forms of discriminatory expression.[10]

In 2009, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal refused to apply section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act against Mark Lemire for discriminatory comments allegedly made by a third party on a website administered by Lemire. The Tribunal held that section 13 is an unjustifiable violation of freedom of expression because it permits the government to penalize individuals with large monetary fines for merely saying something offensive or unpopular.[11]

Over this same period of time, the work of various Canadian civil liberties organizations, like the British Columbia Civil Liberty Association (BCCLA), the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), and the Canadian Constitution Foundation (CCF), brought the censorship of Canada’s various hate speech provisions as contained in human rights legislation under public scrutiny.

In a 1998 position paper of the BCCLA titled “Freedom of Expression in Public Spaces”, the author wrote:

Freedom of expression is not simply an abstract principle. It is a fundamental part of any democratic society. It is also the best weapon we have to combat hateful expression. It is more effective than censorship. If, as a society, we choose to abandon it, we become something less than a democracy. Tolerating speech with which we disagree is thus not only the surest way to minimize the effects of hatred, it is also the surest way we have of supporting democracy itself.[12]

In 2008, Alan Borovoy, the founder of the CCLA was quoted in the Edmonton Journal as saying,

Groups that bash gays, women or religious organizations may be repugnant, but democracies must allow them to speak freely…[13]

A 2008 report published by the CCF argued:

Laws and policies which restrict freedom of expression have a dangerous “chilling effect” which leads to self-censorship among citizens. A restriction on speech affects not only those caught and prosecuted, but also those who may refrain from saying what they would like to because of the fear that they will be caught. Thus, restrictions on freedom of expression inhibit worthy minority groups and individuals from saying what they desire to say for fear that they might be prosecuted.[14]

This author was highly critical of the Taylor decision’s treatment of freedom of expression in a 2012 paper in the C2C Journal.

Subsection 13(1) is too great an interference with freedom of expression, because its intended benefit pales in comparison to the harm it produces. The free expression of ideas, especially those that are unpopular, is of foundational importance in “a free and democratic society”… Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right that is necessary for “a free and democratic society” because it protects individuals from the tyrannies of the state and the majority.[15]

Each of these aforementioned examples provided advocates for liberty and limited government the hope that the Whatcott appeal would give the SCC the an opportunity to reconsider the constitutional issues previously decided in Taylor.

WHATCOTT—a restatement of Taylor

When its decision was released on February 27, 2013, the SCC held that two of Whatcott’s impugned flyers contravened the section 14(1)(b) of the Code, but that the other two did not.

What came as a complete surprise advocates for liberty and limited government was that instead of issuing a highly divided decision—like the Taylor court—the SCC unanimously upheld the constitutionality of section 14(1)(b) of the Code finding only that portion which reads “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity” as unconstitutional.[16] In reaching this conclusion, the SSC held that section 14(1)(b) infringed Whatcott’s Charter rights to freedom of expression[17] and freedom of religion,[18] but that these infringements were justified under section 1.[19]

Of the four flyers at issue, the SCC found the Tribunal’s decision that the first two flyers exposed or tended to expose gays to hatred reasonable. Among other things, those two flyers contained Whatcott’s assertions that gay and lesbian teachers use “dirty language to describe lesbian sex and sodomy to their teenage audience”,[20] and that “Sodomites are 430 times more likely to acquire Aids and 3 times more likely to sexually abuse children”.[21]

The SCC found that the remaining two flyers did not to satisfy the legal definition of hatred. These flyers contained photocopies of personal ads and Whatcott’s handwriting that read,[22]

Saskatchewan’s largest gay magazine allows ads for men seeking boys!;

and,

If you cause one of these little ones to stumble it would be better that a millstone was tied around your neck and you were cast into the sea.

Writing for the unanimous SCC, Rothstein, J. said,

...in my view the Taylor definition of “hatred”, with some modifications, provides a workable approach to interpreting the word “hatred” as it is used in prohibitions of hate speech.[23]

In his subsequent discussion, Rothstein, J. made three main prescriptions to ensure that section 14(1)(b) of the Code operated within the limits placed on all legislation by the Charter.

First, “hatred” must be assessed objectively, not subjectively. The courts must pose the question whether “when considered objectively by a reasonable person aware of the relevant context and circumstances, the speech in question would be understood as exposing or tending to expose members of the target group to hatred.”[24] During the course of an assessment, the adjudicator is to place his or her personal views aside.[25] Shifting the analysis away from the speaker’s intent allegedly helps to answer the criticism that “hatred” is an unworkable as a legal test on account of its irremediable subjectivity.

Second, “hatred” must be restricted to only those extreme manifestations of emotion described by the words “detestation” and “vilification”.[26] Expression that exposes vulnerable groups to detestation and vilification must be far more than merely discrediting, humiliating, or offending. It must vilify and seek to abuse, denigrate, or delegitimize a protected group or person as lawless, dangerous, or unacceptable.[27]

In the SCC’s opinion, this standard will yet permit offensive and repugnant speech provided that it does not incite the high level of abhorrence necessary to satisfy the definition of “hatred”.[28] And building on this definition, human rights legislation should not be considered to aim at the elimination of the emotion of hatred from human experience. Instead, it aims to eliminate extreme forms of expression that have the potential to inspire the illegal discriminatory treatment of protected groups.[29]

Third, adjudicators are to focus on the effect of the expression—i.e. whether the impugned expression is likely to expose a protected group to hatred. The repugnancy of the ideas expressed and the intent of the individual(s) expressing those ideas are not sufficient on their own.[30] It is the mode of public expression and the effect that this mode of expression may have—not the ideas themselves—that must concern adjudicators.[31] And this is where the correct objective test must be applied—would a reasonable person consider the expression vilifying a protected group or individual as having the potential to lead to discrimination?[32]

Applying this to Whatcott, the SCC found in two short paragraphs that section 14(1)(b) of the Code infringed Whatcott’s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Nearly all the remaining analysis in the decision centered on how these infringements are justified under section 1 of the Charter. In the end, the SCC held that Saskatchewan government’s objective in enacting a hate speech prohibition was pressing and substantial[33] and proportional[34]—thereby satisfying the Oakes[35] test.

In dealing with the criticism that the impugned prohibition requires no intent to discriminate, Rothstein, J. offered no new analysis and merely quoted a portion of the Taylor decision before dismissing the criticism in two sentences.

The preventative measures found in human rights legislation reasonably centre on effects, rather than intent. I see no reason to depart from this approach.[36]

Regarding the criticism that the Code requires no proof of actual harm, Rothstein, J. held that establishing a causal link between an expressive statement and any resulting hatred suffered is too onerous a burden for a complainant to bear, and as such, preventative measures—like prohibiting speech deemed hateful without proof of harm—are justified.[37]

And regarding the criticism that the Saskatchewan legislature has provided no defences—including that the content of any impugned expression is true—to individuals accused of publishing hate materials, Rothstein, J. said,

[139] Critics find the absence of a defence of truth of particular concern, given that seeking truth is one of the strongest justifications for freedom of expression. They argue that the right to speak the truth should not be lightly restricted, and that any restriction should be seen as a serious infringement.

[140] I agree with the argument that the quest for truth is an essential component of the “market of ideas” which is, itself, central to a strong democracy. The search for truth is also an important part of self-fulfillment. However, I do not think it is inconsistent with these views to find that not all truthful statements must be free from restriction…

Rothstein, J. then dismissed this criticism since “even truthful statements may be expressed in language or context that exposes a vulnerable group to hatred.”[38]


WHATCOTT—the redaction of the Taylor dissent

In striking contrast with the 1990 Taylor decision, the 2013 Whatcott decision is unanimous and monolithic—there is no dissent. The SCC has closed ranks and will no longer broach alternatives. This means that Chief Justice McLachlin’s Taylor dissent has effectively been redacted. The problems canvassed in Taylor have not been satisfactorily resolved in Whatcott—all we get is the SCC’s undivided assertion that the prohibition is constitutional when applied in a manner complying with the three prescriptions discussed above. But does this imply that there never was a problem? And most importantly, what has happened in the intervening 20+ years to change Chief Justice McLachlin’s mind?

It wasn’t always this way. Freedom of expression and free speech both have long been recognized in Canadian law. The right to freedom of expression in Canada was not created by the Charter. Canadians enjoyed a right to free speech and freedom of expression prior to 1982.

Before she became Chief Justice, Justice McLachlin said in R. v. Keegstra that “freedom of speech is a fundamental Canadian value”,[39] and

Freedom of speech and the press had acquired quasi-constitutional status well before the adoption of the Charter in 1982.

She further said that,

The enactment of s.2(b) of the Charter represented both a continuity of [this] tradition, and a new flourishing of the importance of freedom of expression in Canadian society.[40]

Quoting from A. W. MacKay, "Freedom of Expression: Is It All Just Talk?",[41] Justice McLachlin went on to affirm that,

Freedom of expression was not invented by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms...

Justice McIntyre shared Justice McLachlin’s view. In the SCC RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.[42] decision of 1986, Justice McIntyre indicated the fundamental importance of freedom of expression for our democratic institutions.

Freedom of expression is not, however, a creature of the Charter. It is one of the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of the political, social and educational institutions of western society. Representative democracy, as we know it today, which is in great part the product of free expression and discussion of varying ideas, depends upon its maintenance and protection.[43]

In other words, as the various Canadian civil liberties organizations have been arguing, the continued existence and flourishing of our free society is dependent upon the right of each individual to freely express his or her ideas without fear of reprisal. And regardless of how difficult the SCC says it is to satisfy the legal definition of “hatred”, the threat posed by Canada’s various hate speech prohibitions—of which Saskatchewan’s section 14(1)(b) is an example—does have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

And there’s a simple and ironic fact that cannot be overlooked in all of this. If Whatcott is on a hate campaign, Saskatchewan’s hate speech prohibition has provided him with a powerful means to disseminate his views. Each judicial decision has reproduced and circulated his materials and broadened his public exposure. Had no complaint been made about Whatcott’s flyers in 2001 and 2002, they would have faded into obscurity and Whatcott likely would not have received national media coverage.

At this stage it’s entirely likely that Whatcott will be elevated to the status of folk-hero by those who share his prejudices. Instead of facing a legal prosecution, lending credence to the appearance of martyrdom, Whatcott should have been ignored or debated. After all, it’s best not to silence bigots by the application of force—let them speak, freely. As the old proverb says, even a fool who keeps silent is considered wise.

There is a second irony also. It has not been that long since homosexuality was considered repugnant to the majority of Canadians which resulted in the marginalization of homosexuals within our society. This has changed in part because of the recognition by our governments and courts that freedom of expression without fear of legal reprisal is a fundamental human right. Permitting the free expression of what was once considered repugnant has resulted in greater freedom and legal rights for gay individuals. Thus, to protect a broadly construed individual right to freedom of expression is to preserve the very conditions that made the current more tolerant state of affairs possible.

The SCC has shown itself unwilling to defend a broadly construed constitutional right to freedom of expression as desired by advocates of liberty and limited government from across the political spectrum.

Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act was repealed in 2013 in the months following the Whatcott decision. Saskatchewan’s prohibition remains on the books.

This Case Comment was published in the Alberta Law Review in the Spring of 2014.

ENDNOTES:

[1] Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 [Whatcott].

[2] The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1 [Code].

[3] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].

[4] Whatcott v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Tribunal), 2007 SKQB 450 (CanLII).

[5] Whatcott v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Tribunal), 2010 SKCA 26.

[6] Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 SCR 89 [Taylor].

[7] Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [CHRA].

[8] Ezra Levant, Shakedown (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 2009).

[9] Richard Moon, "Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission Concerning Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Hate Speech on the Internet" (October 2008) online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865282

[10] Ibid. at 1.

[11] Warman v. Lemire, 2009 CHRT 26. This decision was overturned and the constitutionality of section 13 upheld on appeal to the Federal Court in Warman v. Lemire, 2012 FC 1162.

[12] “Freedom of Expression in Public Spaces”, online: http://bccla.org/our_work/freedom-of-expression-in-public-spaces/

[13] Edmonton Journal, “Defence of Free Speech Must be Absolute” Edmonton Journal (28 October 2008) online: http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/cityplus/story.html?id=449e1994-5d1d-4808-abca-aa7b1f096f66

[14] John Carpay and Desmond Burton-Williams, “The Right to Offend: a Canadian Constitutional Principle” online: http://theccf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/The-Right-to-Offend.pdf

[15] Karen Selick and Derek From, “The Charter at 30: Charter Jurisprudence that Went off the Rails” C2C Journal (19 March 2012) online: http://c2cjournal.ca/2012/03/the-charter-at-30-charter-jurisprudence-that-went-off-the-rails/

[16] Ibid. at paras. 99-100.

[17] Ibid. at para. 63.

[18] Ibid. at para. 156.

[19] Ibid. at paras. 151 & 164.

[20] Whatcott, at para. 182.

[21] Ibid. at para. 183.

[22] Ibid. at para. 184.

[23] Ibid. at para. 55.

[24] Ibid. at para. 35. Also see para. 56.

[25] Ibid. at para. 35.

[26] The Taylor decision also included “calumny”—along with “detestation” and “vilification”—but this is now unnecessary for reasons described in para. 42 of Whatcott.

[27] Whatcott, at para. 41.

[28] Ibid. at para. 57.

[29] Ibid. at para 48.

[30] Ibid. at para. 58.

[31] Ibid. at para 51.

[32] Ibid. para. 52.

[33] Ibid. at paras. 69-77.

[34] Ibid. at paras. 78-151.

[35] R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.

[36] Whatcott, at para. 127.

[37] Ibid. at para. 130.

[38] Ibid. at para. 141.

[39] [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 809.

[40] Ibid. at 808.

[41] (1989), 68 Can. Bar Rev. 713.

[42] [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.

[43] Ibid. at para. 12.

Alberta's Municipal Anti-Bullying Laws are Deeply Flawed

One of the easiest ways for a municipal politician to keep his constituents happy is to give them what they want. Sometimes this means enacting popular yet dubious bylaws.

Perhaps this is the impetus behind the Town of Airdrie's push to amend its Public Behaviour Bylaw to prohibit bullying. After all, nearly everyone will rally behind politicians who enact laws to protect children from harm, regardless of those laws' faults.

And Airdrie is not alone. Many other municipal governments in Alberta have already enacted similar bylaws. For instance, Consort, Grand Prairie, Hanna, and Rocky Mountain House each already prohibit bullying. Oyen's Town Council has discussed it. There are likely many others.

Each of these bylaws is similar. Bullying will not be tolerated at any place in town to which the public has access. In some municipalities, bullies can be fined up to $1,000 plus costs, and be imprisoned for six months on default of payment. These are significant penalties.

Regardless of their goal, each of these bylaws is flawed. They are redundant and viciously subjective, they make some acts illegal that they shouldn't, and they are outside of the jurisdiction of any Alberta municipality.

Consort's bylaw considers "harassment of others by the real or threatened infliction of physical violence and attacks" and the "extortion or stealing of money and possessions" as bullying. But harassment, extortion, and theft are already illegal. How will enacting yet another law solve the problem when there's an apparent lack of will to enforce current laws?

Grand Prairie's bylaw defines bullying as an "objectionable or inappropriate comment, conduct or display" directed at an individual "which causes or is likely to cause physical or emotional distress". Simply put, this is vague and hopelessly subjective. By relying on words like "objectionable" and "inappropriate" and requiring those enforcing the law to find the line between behaviours that are likely to cause emotional distress and those that are not, this bylaw will inevitably function as a proxy for the personal views of those enforcing it. This could easily make all sorts of otherwise excusable behaviours illegal. For example, a fine could be issued for a single hurtful comment uttered in anger even though "bullying" is generally understood to mean repeated hurtful behaviour.

Rocky Mountain House's bylaw, like the others, applies in all locations that the public has access, including schools, public parks, recreational facilities, and even sports grounds. Don't taunt the umpire at a baseball game in Grand Prairie--even in jest--because if it could be construed as likely to cause emotional distress and you could be fined for single offhanded remark. And while in Hanna, it's best to avoid verbally taunting your opponents if you are playing in the game.

At their core, these bullying bans are unadulterated attempts to restrict freedom of expression and are therefore outside of municipal jurisdiction. Alberta's Municipal Government Act lists three municipal purposes, none of which grants municipalities the power to enact laws for the sole purpose of restricting expression. Further, the Province of Alberta cannot delegate to municipalities the authority to restrict expression. Under the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial laws may only incidentally restrict expression provided those laws are otherwise within provincial jurisdiction.

But it's not all bad. There is some good in these bylaws. Each demonstrates that bullying is not acceptable and should not be tolerated, and issuing fines may be a quick and efficient means to curb hurtful behaviour. And to be clear, no one endorses or excuses real bullying. It can have devastating and lasting effects, particularly on children.

Regardless, the flaws in these bylaws cannot be ignored. Each needlessly duplicate other laws, some make excusable and non-reoccurring acts illegal, and all overstep municipal and constitutional authority. Think of the problem this way. What these bylaws do--they should not. What they should do--they cannot. Relying on bad laws to prevent bullying is similar to believing that two wrongs somehow make a right.

This piece was first published in the Huffington Post on September 24, 2013.

Censorship Laws Do Not Protect Everyone

On June 19th, comedian Guy Earle lost his appeal of a 2011 BC Human Rights Tribunal decision. The Tribunal found that Earle discriminated against Lorna Pardy during an open mic event for amateur stand-up comics. The story of what happened is difficult to piece together, but it seems that Pardy heckled Earle and he responded by making insulting comments regarding her sexual orientation. The confrontation escalated to the point where Pardy threw a glass of water in Earle’s face. The Tribunal ordered Earle to pay Pardy $15,000 for injury to her “dignity, feelings, and self-respect”—yes, that’s something that human rights laws often protect. The Supreme Court of British Columbia upheld the Tribunal’s decision.

In contrast, in 2003, the Alberta Human Rights Commission did not protect the dignity, feelings, or self-respect of Quintin Johnson. Johnson, a Christian, had complained to the Commission regarding a song titled “Kill the Christian” by the death metal band Deicide. The lyrics included “you are the one we despise”, “I will love watching you die”, and “kill the Christian”. The Commission dismissed Johnson’s complaint on the grounds that Deicide did not have a wide enough listening audience or popular appeal, even though the band had sold nearly 500,000 albums in the U.S. alone by that time.

So why is Earle’s artistic expression discriminatory while Deicide’s is not? What makes Earle’s expression more harmful than Deicide’s?

It’s not the content of the expression. Deicide is counselling violence against Christians, while Earle only demeaned Pardy’s sexuality. Earle may have hurt Pardy’s feelings, but Deicide’s lyrics may be vociferous enough to sustain an investigation under the “hate propaganda” section of the Criminal Code.

It’s not the context of the performances. The song “Kill the Christian” can be purchased at nearly any popular music record store. It is available online via iTunes, Amazon, and from a myriad of other online music retailers. And because of the nature of recorded music, a listener can choose to hear the song over and over again. Earle’s insults were purely transient. After he uttered them, no one, including Pardy, could hear them again.

It’s not the size of the audience. Deicide regularly tours the world, including Canada, and is free to perform music that advocates killing members of the Christian faith. Yet when Earle stood on a stage and made one-time remarks about Pardy’s sexuality, she was awarded $15,000 of Earle’s money. The complaint against Deicide was dismissed because the audience was deemed too small. Yet Earle’s audience was much smaller.

Maybe it’s who the complaint was made about? Deicide’s lyrics are written by the band’s vocalist, Glen Benton. It would be an extreme understatement to say that Benton is a controversial figure in the music industry. He has been labelled an animal abuser, a misogynist, and an anti-Christian Satanist. Earle, on the other hand, is a law-abiding amateur stand-up comic who has an otherwise untarnished reputation.

To be absolutely clear, both Deicide and Earle should have won their human rights cases. Freedom of expression and the liberty to speak freely should prevail. Further, no government official should be in the business of deciding what qualifies as artistic expression or determining the value of that expression.

Even if Pardy and Johnson suffered hurt feelings, neither one should be permitted to drag the party who hurt their feelings through a human rights process. Both Pardy and Johnson should have demonstrated their maturity by walking away. Pardy could have walked out of the club that night at the first sign of trouble. If she had, there would have been no problem. Johnson could have easily avoided Deicide’s music. Had he done so, he could not have been offended.

Any clear-headed appraisal of these cases would find Deicide’s expression more harmful than Earle’s. So if it’s not the content, the context, the audience, or the person who the complaint was made about, then what?

The lesson to be learned is that human rights laws only protect certain people—the identity of the complainant matters. Because Pardy is a lesbian, her feelings are protected by the law. As a Christian, Johnson’s are not.

This piece first appeared in the Huffington Post in July 2013.

Canadians should be free to speak without fear

Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that governments are permitted to violate the right of Canadians to speak freely about issues of public importance in order to stamp out any expression they consider hateful. (SK v. Whatcott)

In 2001 and 2002, William Whatcott, a self-proclaimed anti-gay, anti-muslim, anti-you-fill-in-the-blank activist, distributed offensive flyers in Regina and Saskatoon. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal ruled that the flyers contravened the province's hate speech prohibition.

On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench upheld the tribunal's decision, while the provincial Court of Appeal overturned it. The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal in October 2011.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision is a devastating blow to free speech and the rights of every individual Canadian. In principle, this decision means that the government can silence your speech on issues of public importance if that speech is deemed hateful. It doesn't matter if what you said was true, that it caused no one any harm, or that you never intended to say anything discriminatory - you can still be dragged into court and lose for committing a victimless crime.

In its 1990 Taylor decision, the Supreme Court of Canada reached a similar conclusion - with one salient difference. In Taylor, Justice Beverley McLachlin (as she was then) wrote a strong and clear-headed dissent. She canvassed many of the problems with hate speech prohibitions.

Hatred is an ambiguous and emotionally charged term, capable of a wide range of meanings among different people. Incapable of precise definition, it inevitably functions as a proxy for the personal and political views of the judiciary. Further, a successful hate speech prosecution requires no proof of actual harm or intent to discriminate, and truth is no defence. These are serious, irremediable flaws.

Fast-forward to 2013. Unlike Taylor, the Whatcott decision is unanimous and monolithic - there is no dissent. The Supreme Court of Canada has closed ranks and will no longer broach alternatives. This means that McLachlin's Taylor dissent has effectively been redacted, leaving us with muddled confusion.

The problems canvassed in Taylor are not resolved in Whatcott - all we get is the Supreme Court of Canada's undivided assertion that no problems exist. Does that imply that there never was a problem? What has happened in the intervening 23 years to change McLachlin's mind?

It wasn't always this way. The Supreme Court of Canada once recognized that the freedom to express unpopular and even offensive ideas is of foundational importance to a free and democratic society.

In 1986, Justice William McIntyre said,

[Freedom of expression] is one of the fundamental concepts that have formed the basis for the historical development of the political, social and educational institutions of western society. Representative democracy, as we know it today, which is in great part the product of free expression and discussion of varying ideas, depends upon its maintenance and protection.

In other words, the continued existence and thriving of our free society is dependent upon the right of each individual to freely express his or her ideas without fear of reprisal.

There's one simple and ironic fact that cannot be overlooked in all of this.

If Whatcott is on a hate campaign, Saskatchewan's hate speech prohibition has provided him with a powerful means to disseminate his views. Each judicial decision has reproduced and circulated his materials. Had no complaint been made about Whatcott's flyers in 2001 and 2002, they would have faded into obscurity and this marginalized, bigoted, fundamentalist would not have received national media coverage.

At this stage, it's entirely likely that Whatcott will be elevated to the status of folk hero by those who share his prejudices. Instead of facing a legal prosecution, lending credence to the appearance of martyrdom, Whatcott should have been ignored or debated. It's best not to silence bigots - let them speak, freely. As the old proverb says, even a fool who keeps silent is considered wise.

The Supreme Court of Canada has shown itself unwilling to uphold the right of Canadians to express their views without worry of a state prosecution. The best answer to this problem has always been legislative. Canada's hate speech laws were enacted by governments and can be repealed at any time by those same governments. It's time to hold our politicians' feet to the proverbial fire for the good of all Canadians.

This piece was originally published in the Calgary Herald on March 4, 2013

Dean Steacy was wrong: Freedom of Speech is a Fundamental Canadian Value

The right to freedom of expression in Canada was not created by the Charter. Canadians enjoyed a right to free speech and freedom of expression prior to 1982.

Before she became Chief Justice, Justice McLachlin said in Keegstra that “freedom of speech is a fundamental Canadian value”, and 

Freedom of speech and the press had acquired quasi-constitutional status well before the adoption of the Charter in 1982. 

She further said that, 

The enactment of s.2(b) of the Charter represented both a continuity of [this] tradition, and a new flourishing of the importance of freedom of expression in Canadian society. 

Quoting from A. W. MacKay, "Freedom of Expression: Is It All Just Talk?" (1989), 68 Can. Bar Rev. 713, Justice McLachlin went on to affirm that, 

Freedom of expression was not invented by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms... 

Justice McIntyre shared Justice McLachlin’s view. In the Supreme Court of Canada Dolphin Delivery decision of 1986, Justice McIntyre indicated the fundamental importance of freedom of expression for our democratic institutions. 

Freedom of expression is not, however, a creature of the Charter. It is one of the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of the political, social and educational institutions of western society. Representative democracy, as we know it today, which is in great part the product of free expression and discussion of varying ideas, depends upon its maintenance and protection.

Now that you know all this, doesn't it make you wonder what Dean Steacy (the lead Canadian Human Rights Commission investigator in the Marc Lemire case) meant when he said,

Freedom of speech is an American concept, so I don't give it any value... It's not my job to give value to an American concept.

Actually, Mr. Steacy, freedom of speech is a fundamental Canadian value that the Supreme Court of the land has ruled responsible for the maintenance and protection of Canadian society.

Canada Should Repeal Its Blasphemy Law

It's time for Canada to repeal its prohibition on blasphemous libel.

Section 296 of the Criminal Code of Canada makes it an indictable offence to publish blasphemous libel.  Upon conviction, an accused is liable for up to two years of imprisonment.  Section 296 permits an accused the defence of “good faith” provided that “decent language” is used. 

296. (1) Every one who publishes a blasphemous libel is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

(2) It is a question of fact whether or not any matter that is published is a blasphemous libel.

(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section for expressing in good faith and in decent language, or attempting to establish by argument used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, an opinion on a religious subject.

It’s probably a safe bet that most Canadians do not know what the term “blasphemy” means, let alone that blasphemous libel is a criminal offence.  According to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, to blaspheme means to insult or show contempt or a lack of reverence for God or other things sacred.

Originally, blasphemous libel was specifically tied to publishing materials that brought the Christian religion into disrepute—presumably excluding other religions.  The courts held the prohibition to include any profane words vilifying God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Bible, or Christianity if it was done with the intent to shock or insult believers, or mislead the ignorant and unwary.

Arguably, the most recent decision on section 296 generalized the prohibition so that it may now be possible to blaspheme other religions as well.  But this has not been tested in court because the prohibition has fallen into disuse.

The first time I read this prohibition in the Criminal Code during law school, I found it surprising that Canada has any sort of law prohibiting blasphemy.  First, blasphemy is everywhere.  It is not difficult to find all sorts of published material that break this law—movies, music, books, magazines, video games, visual art, etc.  And second, any sort of prohibition on blasphemy strikes me as an unacceptable restriction on freedom of expression and one more potential foothold for tyranny.  Notice that the way that the prohibition is worded inevitably makes it function as a proxy for the personal and political views of the judiciary.  Perhaps "foothold for tyranny" is an understatement?

Fortunately, there have not been any blasphemous libel prosecutions in Canada since the 1930’s.  It is likely that section 296 is effectively dead even though it remains in the Criminal Code.

But being effectively dead is not truly dead.  The UK has had a similar prohibition with much the same story as Canada’s—it languished unused for a significant period of time.  Yet in the 1979 case of Whitehouse v. Lemon, Mary Whitehouse resurrected the UK’s blasphemous libel prohibition in a successful private prosecution.  The accused was convicted but did not have to serve the prison term.  By the way, the UK repealed its blasphemy law in 2008.

Aside from the important point that effectively dead laws are not guaranteed dead, there are other reasons to repeal section 296. 

First, the continued existence of a prohibition on blasphemy places Canada in an awkward and hypocritical position when it criticizes other countries of religious intolerance.  Remember the famous admonition to take the mote out of your own eye first?

And second, there is no certainty that the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression will offer any protection to an individual accused of blasphemous libel.  That’s an unanswered question that has never been tested in court.  Sadly, there are cases that refer to section 296 as a potentially justifiable violation of freedom of expression.  Also, there is no shortage of cases where the courts have deferred to the government and upheld restrictions on speech.  Trials are inherently uncertain and court decisions can often yield surprising results.

It’s probably best to repeal section 296 rather than assume that it will never be used in the future.

So Far So Good... or maybe not.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is 30 years old in 2012.

In Canadian law, the “Charter” is the first 34 sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. Broadly speaking, the Charter is a bill of rights recognizing individual rights and limiting the authority of the federal and provincial governments.

For example, section 2 of the Charter guarantees that everyone has the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and association.

Section 7 contains another important rights guarantee. This section recognizes that everyone has a right to liberty constrained only by the demands of justice—presumably the liberty of criminals can be constrained.

There was good reason to be optimistic in 1982 when the Charter was new—various portions were drafted to protect individual freedoms by limiting government authority. But in the 30 years following, the courts in Canada have continually done the opposite. Instead of the Charter protecting individual freedoms from overreaching governments, it has been given a government-promoting interpretation that negatively impacts upon individual freedoms.

In an article prepared for the C2C Journal, Karen Selick and I outline four portions of the Charter that have been given this government-promoting interpretation. You can read the article online here.

Here is a brief outline of the article.

• In the 1990 Canada v. Taylor decision, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) restricted the section 2(b) individual right to freedom of expression in order to preserve the hate speech provision in the Canadian Human Rights Act.
• In the 1991 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union decision, the SCC held that the section 2(d) freedom of association does not prohibit the government from forcing individuals to associate.
• In the 1988 R. v. Morgentaler decision, the SCC decided that the section 7 right to liberty grants individuals only a degree of autonomy when making decisions of fundamental personal importance, and that decisions of lesser significance could expect no constitutional protection.
• In the 2003 R. v. Malmo-Levine decision, the SCC decided that the government is free punish individuals for actions that cause no one any harm, despite the section 7 guarantee of individual liberty.

For the full discussion on each of these issues, go to the C2C Journal’s website and read the entire article. I think you will be convinced that the first 30 years of the Charter’s existence have yielded mixed results.


This appeared in the Canadian Constitution Foundation's blog in February 2012.

Christians to the Lions: Christians cannot be discriminated against

In 2006, I attended a Behemoth concert at Toronto’s Opera House with two Christian friends.  If you are unfamiliar with Behemoth, they are a Polish death metal band that tends to sing about the evils of organized religion.  They also profess that they have the freedom to vociferously speak their minds.

Each of us was familiar with Behemoth and their opinions prior to going to the concert, so it came as no surprise when the band performed some of its most popular songs like “Christians to the Lions”.

Despite titles like this, my friends chose to attend the concert because they enjoyed the music and could easily ignore anything they found hurtful or offensive.

But about halfway through Behemoth’s set, it became very difficult to ignore the content of the band’s message.  In the silence between two songs, the band’s lead vocalist instructed the Christians in the audience to raise their hands.  A few poor souls did.  Then the lead vocalist instructed the rest of the audience to find a self-professed Christian and tell them “f*** you”.

I wish that I could somehow accurately convey how intimidating this must have been for those people that actually raised their hands.  Unless you’ve been to a metal concert, I don’t think that I can sufficiently explain it.  It is one of those things you have to experience for yourself.

Thankfully, my friends were not foolish enough to identify themselves as Christians.  The dimly lit venue was packed full of testosterone and beer fuelled concert-goers, and lead vocalist’s request could easily have resulted in violence. 

As unbelievable as it may seem, had this concert been in Alberta, the Alberta Human Rights Commission would have found that Behemoth’s instruction was not discriminatory.  Even though Behemoth singled out a religious group for public ridicule and contempt, because Christians are not a disadvantaged group, they are afforded no protection from discriminatory acts.

I previously wrote an Op-Ed on this issue that was published by the Vancouver Sun and Troy Media. You can read it on this blog here. 

I don't have the time right now, but I will soon write a blog about why I think that Christians should be interested in protecting Behemoth's right to express a strident anti-christian message.

More Thoughts on Earle and Deicide

I recently wrote an op-ed that was published by Troy Media and the Vancouver Sun. The gist of the piece was that Human Rights legislation only provides protection to some, and definitely not to all. In the article, I point out that Lorna Pardy is protected, but Quintin Johnson is not. Since op-eds are brief, I thought that I would make some further observations about the same two cases.

• Both Pardy and Johnson should have lost their human rights cases. Freedom of expression, particularly artistic expression, should have been the winner. And no government official should be in the business of deciding what is artistic expression or determining the value of that expression.
• Even if Pardy and Johnson had hurt feelings, neither one should be permitted to drag the party who hurt their feelings through a human rights process. Both Pardy and Johnson were trying to do a “shakedown”, in Ezra Levant’s sense of the term.
• Both Pardy and Johnson should have demonstrated their freedom by walking away. Pardy could have walked away from Earle. If she had, her problem would have been solved. Johnson could easily have avoided Deicide’s music. Had he done so, he could not have been offended. 

Even though I may seem to come down hard on Deicide in the op-ed, I actually support their right to freely express the views that they do… and I would defend their artistic expression from detractors. Canadian society has already ceded too much power over speech to ill-equipped and ill-informed human rights bureaucrats. Even if Deicide is offensive, I support their right to freedom of expression because the freedom they enjoy is ultimately the same freedom that protects my own expression of contrary views.

\m/

This appeared in the Canadian Constitution Foundation's blog in July 2011.

Identity Matters

Comedian Guy Earle recently filed a petition at the Supreme Court in British Columbia to appeal a decision of the BC Human Rights Tribunal. The Tribunal held that Earle discriminated against Lorna Pardy during an open mic event for amateur stand-up comics. Pardy heckled Earle and he responded by making insulting comments regarding her sexual orientation. These comments resulted in the Tribunal ordering Earle to pay Pardy $15,000.00 for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

In contrast, in 2003, the Alberta Human Rights Commission did not protect the dignity, feelings, or self-respect of Quintin Johnson.  Johnson, a Christian, had complained to the Commission regarding a song titled “Kill the Christian” by the death metal band Deicide.  The lyrics included “you are the one we despise”, “I will love watching you die”, and “kill the Christian”.  The Commission dismissed Johnson’s complaint on the grounds that Deicide did not have a wide enough listening audience or popular appeal, even though the band had sold nearly 500,000 albums in the US alone by that time.

So why is Earle’s artistic expression discriminatory while Deicide’s is not?  What makes Earle’s expression more harmful than Deicide’s?

It’s not the content of the expression.  Deicide is counselling the murder of Christians, while Earle only demeaned Pardy’s sexuality.  Earle may have hurt Pardy’s feelings, but Deicide’s lyrics may be vociferous enough to sustain an investigation under the Hate Propoganda section of the Criminal Code.

It’s not the context of the performances.  The song “Kill the Christian” can be purchased at nearly any popular music record store.  It is available online via iTunes, Amazon, and from a myriad of other online music retailers.  And because of the nature of recorded music, a listener can choose to hear the song over and over again.  Earle’s insults were purely transient.  After he uttered them, no one, including Pardy, could hear them again.

It’s not the size of the audience.  Deicide regularly tours the world, including Canada, and is free to perform music that advocates killing members of the Christian faith.  Yet when Earle stood on a stage and made one-time remarks about Pardy’s sexuality, she was awarded $15,000.00 of Earle’s money.  The complaint against Deicide was dismissed because the audience was deemed too small.  Yet Earle’s audience was much smaller.

Maybe it’s who the complaint was made about?  Deicide’s lyrics are written by the band’s vocalist, Glen Benton.  It would be an extreme understatement to say that Benton is a controversial figure in the music industry.  He has been labelled an animal abuser, a misogynist, and an anti-Christian Satanist.  Earle, on the other hand, is a law-abiding amateur stand-up comic who has an otherwise untarnished reputation.

Any clear-headed appraisal of these facts would find Deicide’s expression more harmful than Earle’s.  So if it’s not the content, the context, the audience, or the person who the complaint was made about, then what?

The lesson to be learned is that the law only protects certain people: the identity of the complainant matters.  Because Pardy is a lesbian, her feelings are protected by the law.  As a Christian, Johnson’s are not.

These cases are not anomalies.  This is the way that our human rights legislation works.  Individuals deemed to be part of “vulnerable” groups get protection, while others do not.  And it is difficult to understand how this is constitutional.  In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada said that section 15(1) of the Charter will strike down laws that harm human dignity.

Comedian, Guy Earle, recently filed a petition at the Supreme Court in British Columbia to appeal a decision of the BC Human Rights Tribunal.  The Tribunal held that Earle discriminated against Lorna Pardy during an open mic event for amateur stand-up comics.  Pardy heckled Earle and he responded by making insulting comments regarding her sexual orientation.  These comments resulted in the Tribunal ordering Earle to pay Pardy $15,000.00 for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

Human dignity within the meaning of [section 15(1)] does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law.  Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?

I wonder if Johnson feels unfairly treated knowing that the law protects Pardy’s feelings but not his?


Published in July 2011 by Troy Media and Vancouver Sun.