Bylaws Made in Secret, Good Government, and Economic Freedom

Last July 16, Calgary city council voted to enact a bylaw to ban the distribution and sale of shark fins in Calgary.

Ald. Brian Pincott brought the bylaw to council supported by a petition containing thousands of signatures. Ald. John Mar admonished Calgary’s Chinese-Canadians saying they may need to give up some of their traditions, such as shark fin soup. Coverage by some media outlets juxtaposed images of Chinese restaurants and mutilated sharks. As a result, few people outside of Calgary’s Chinese community have questioned the good intentions behind council’s decision. But more of us should.

Council justifies the proposed bylaw on two grounds. First, sharks are “apex predators” that accumulate toxins such as mercury in their bodies. Shark fins therefore contain dangerous levels of mercury. Second, some 70 million sharks are allegedly caught each year, stripped of their fins, and thrown back helpless into the ocean to die a painful death. So shark fins are therefore cruel and unethical.

These two justifications may seem innocuous, initially. Although Alberta’s Municipal Government Act is silent regarding sharks, it does give municipalities the authority to pass laws for human safety, health, and welfare.

So is the proposed bylaw about protecting humans from toxins like mercury? If sharks are contaminated with mercury, why would council ban only the fins and not the entire shark? Why is the practice of finning sharks and not fishing sharks the focus of the bylaw? Also, what about tuna? Tuna is an ocean dwelling apex predator that accumulates mercury, and it’s more regularly consumed by Calgarians than shark fins. If human health is truly council’s concern, the bylaw would be about the regulation or banning of mercury in foods, not just shark fins.

The human health justification appears to be a contrivance designed to divert attention from the fact that council has no authority to enact legislation protecting sharks.

Toronto had a similar ban until November 2012 when a judge ruled the bylaw was outside of Toronto’s authority. Even though Calgary is a different city, in a different province, and functioning under different legislation, the legal principles relied upon by the Ontario judge would similarly strike down Calgary’s proposed bylaw. Like Toronto’s, Calgary’s ban is simply not about protecting human health — it’s about the preservation of a marine animal over which council has no jurisdiction.

Of course, Calgary’s city council could not have known in July about the legal status of municipal shark fin bans before the judge struck down Toronto’s bylaw in November — or could they?

On July 16, hidden behind closed doors, council was given legal advice regarding the proposed bylaw. That advice is currently unavailable because council directed that it remain confidential under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. That seems odd.

Upon exiting their private meeting, council resolved to ask the provincial and federal governments to enact shark fin bans. Why? Perhaps the city’s legal department told council that the proposed ban is outside the city’s authority. If that’s the case, council knew their ban was potentially illegal prior to Toronto’s bylaw being stuck down.

What’s disturbing about this scenario is far more than shark finning. If city council was told that banning shark fins may be outside of their authority, and yet continued efforts to enact the ban while keeping that unfavourable legal advice hidden, what else are they capable of? And even if council was not initially aware that the ban may be outside their authority, they became aware after Toronto’s bylaw was struck down.

This should trouble every Calgarian, not just the Chinese community. Don’t be misled — this ban is about far more than shark fins. Calgarians should consider whether they can trust a council that keeps secrets while seeking to enact legislation it knows may exceed its authority.

The real issues are good government and the freedom to earn an honest living. A Calgary restaurant owner assured me that she purchases shark products not from China but only from Spain — a country that regulates its shark industry to prevent overfishing and cruelty. Throughout the EU, the whole shark is harvested. The media’s gory portrayal of floundering mutilated animals is simply inaccurate in her case. She is serving an ethical and sustainable food product to her customers. It would be unjust if council’s overly broad ban stripped this facet of her livelihood away.

This piece was originally published by the Calgary Herald on February 6, 2013 and Troy Media on February 7, 2013.

Economic Freedom helps Consumers

Ontario Progressive Conservative leader Tim Hudak’s plan to privatize retail liquor sales in Ontario—ending the near total monopolies of the LCBO and The Beer Store—is an ambitious step towards prioritizing consumer and retailer interests. And even if his plan relinquishes only part of the Ontario government’s control over liquor, it will result in greater economic freedom.

On this issue, Ontario could learn a lesson from Alberta. In 1993, Alberta privatized the retail portion of liquor distribution within the province. By all accounts, it has been successful. Since then, liquor sales have increased, resulting in higher government revenues while consumers enjoy greater product selection and lower prices. This has been the direct result of a more competitive and freer market—i.e. greater economic freedom. And there is no evidence that crime or alcohol related offences have increased as a result. 

Saskatchewan and Manitoba are both currently experimenting with the same idea. And who can blame them? What province doesn’t want to increase its revenues and cut costs all without causing any of the social ills that modern-day prohibitionists expect?

But, as Gerry Nichols points out in his Toronto Star article on Dec 4, it will be difficult for Hudak to relinquish government control over liquor sales because “well-funded special interest groups have a keen desire to keep the monopoly alive.” 


VESTED INTERESTS: Unions

Nichols’s point is borne out in Saskatchewan. On its website, the Saskatchewan Government Employees’ Union issued a press release decrying the opening of two private liquor stores in the province. SGEU president, Bob Bymoen says, "Alcohol is not just another consumer product. It is a drug that can and does cause serious problems for families and communities. Because of that, Saskatchewan citizens should have a say in how alcohol is sold in this province."

Chanting the same mantra, Manitoba’s government employees’ union opposes liquor sale privatization because it is dangerous. An MGEU press release says, "Alcohol is an intoxicant and it can be extremely harmful if misused or abused. The fact is that regulating alcohol sales is the responsible choice for Manitoba families and communities.”

As expected, these union outcries are shrill, at odds with the interests of the consuming public and small retailers, unsubstantiated by the empirical evidence collected over 20 years in Alberta, and contrary to economic freedom. But each does substantiate Nichols’s claim—the Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union (OPSEU) will likely oppose Hudak’s plan.

VESTED INTERESTS: Labatts, Molson, and Sleeman

But it’s not only the OPSEU that will resist a freer market and greater competition. Hudak will also have to stand up to Labatts, Molson, and Sleeman.

The LCBO is government owned and operated, but The Beer Store is a private organization owned by three major breweries: Labatt Brewing Company Ltd., Molson Coors Brewing Company Ltd., and Sleeman Brewery Ltd. Even though The Beer Store is meant to be a non-profit, the owner breweries are able to restrict competition to the detriment of both the non-owner breweries and the consuming public.

There are two obvious means by which The Beer Store can restrict competition: through fees and product placement.

Non-owner breweries are charged two fees to have their products sold in The Beer Store. The first is a listing fee of $2,650.14, plus $212.02 per retail location where the product will be available. And the second is a handling fee between $3.65 and $4.15 for every case of 24 beers. As ludicrous as it seems, under the current system, non-owner breweries must pay substantial fees to their competitors if they want their product to be available at Ontario’s biggest retail outlet for beer.

The Beer Store can also restrict competition by giving product placement priority to the owner-breweries’ products. And because of the Ontario government’s control over the liquor market, these other producers do not have the option to open their own retail outlets to compete with The Beer Store and its owner breweries.

This government mandated arrangement results in higher prices and a more limited selection for Ontarians while it inhibits the development of a retail industry that would be more responsive to market demands.

TAKE 'EM DOWN!

Hudak will need to take on both the OPSEU and the private owners of The Beer Store if he wants to give Ontarians the benefits of an Alberta-styled liquor retail industry. In the end, consumers, small producers, and small retailers will thank him because it will be a boon for economic freedom.

This piece was published by Troy Media on December 9, 2012

Put Students First by Permitting Competition in Education

Imagine a world where General Motors has to ask Ford’s permission to bring a new car to market. In such a scenario, GM spends its own resources in research and development, gauging consumer demand, and implementing new procedures for efficient manufacturing. GM’s competitor, Ford, does nothing.

Now imagine that Ford has the legal authority to hijack any of GM’s ideas and claim them for itself. Everyone knows there is something unfair about this. If this arrangement does not drive GM out of business, it will negatively impact upon consumer choice. There are few surer ways to stifle innovation and market-responsiveness.

But this is precisely what Alberta’s new Education Act does. The act continues to require that an application for a new charter school must be first presented to the local school board. The school board has two options if it thinks the charter proposal has merit: it can reject it—only to see students exit its own schools—or it can mimic (i.e. hijack) the application by starting an “alternative program”. Either way, the school board gets first dibs. This is a clear conflict of interests.

This problem is not hypothetical—it has happened at least once already. The All Boys Program in Calgary is based upon an application originally made for a charter school. The Calgary Board of Education (CBE) hijacked the proposal and claimed for itself the effort invested in the application. Adding insult to injury, the CBE implemented the proposal minus some key innovations—such as merit-based pay for teachers. This half-hearted implementation has reportedly undermined some of the program’s effectiveness.

University of British Columbia Dean of Education, Lynn Bosetti, says “local school boards have no incentive to support charter schools”, and that school boards—like the CBE—perceive charter schools as “undesirable competition”. Could this be true? Undesirable competition? Shouldn’t Alberta’s public school system prioritize student needs? Fostering market-based fair competition between charter and government schools would be an excellent vehicle to prioritize student needs. Instead, the act undermines competition to the detriment of student interests.

This anti-competitive arrangement is contrary to entire impetus behind the charter school movement.

In 1994, the Government of Alberta passed legislation creating charter schools by permitting non-profit organizations to operate public schools to increase school choice and parental involvement while adopting innovative instructional methods to improve educational outcomes. Charter schools are supposed to be the testing grounds for the delivery of public education. The problem is that the charter schools have become too successful.

Today, charters continue to operate tuition-free publicly funded schools that, along with private schools, consistently out-rank the majority of government public schools on the Fraser Institute’s annual School Report Card. True to their mandate, the charters have innovated. There are charters tailored to meet specific student needs, including one for English is a second language students, one for at-risk youth, and others that emphasize fine arts, music, and science. The students in these programs flourish.

If enrolment is an indication of meeting market demand, then charter schools are wildly successful. One Calgary charter has its enrolment capped by the government at just under 3,000 students and is annually filled to capacity while approximately 7,000 students wait to get in. For your child to attend this charter, you must apply nearly as soon as he or she is born.

But the strength and value of charter schools is not solely how they have innovated and produced superior results compared to government schools. Another significant success is in empowering parents. When parents have a choice of where to send their child to school, the decision becomes a matter of careful consideration. This creates a new relationship between the parent and the school freely chosen—one that’s markedly different than the complacency and compromise that characterizes having no choice but the local government school. As Sheldon Richman points out in his 1994 book “Separating School and State”, the single most important factor in a child’s educational success is an active, supportive family. By offering parents a choice of school outside of the government’s offerings, charter schools help to accomplish that.

Competition is always better than monopoly for consumers, and the delivery of educational services is no different than any other industry. The legislature has done Alberta’s students and parents a great disservice in the Education Act. By making charter schools beholden to school boards with vested interests, the government is sending a clear message: student needs and educational outcomes are not the government’s primary objectives.

This piece was originally published by Troy Media on December 3, 2012

Confusing Compulsion for Freedom

The Toronto Sun reported yesterday that one of the reasons the Quebec student protests were so well-organized last spring is because the protesters were receiving financial help from unions across the country.

Canadian unions are well-known to give financial support to political causes—almost exclusively to those on the left side of the political spectrum. Many provinces in Canada, including Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia, have enacted legislation that forces even non-union members to pay union dues. And regardless of the wishes of the individuals forced to financially support them, unions are permitted to spend the money they collect to advance political causes that those same unwilling supporters oppose.

This issue was before the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1991 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union case. This case examined whether the Charter right to freedom of association prohibits the government from compelling individuals into associations against their will.

Lavigne was a teacher at a community college. His employment contract incorporated the so-called Rand Formula, which forced him to pay union fees regardless of whether he was a union member. The union then used Lavigne’s money to support the NDP and other political causes that he deeply opposed.

Once he became aware of this, Lavigne applied to get his money back so that it could not be used to further causes he considered unjust. His application was unsuccessful so he appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The court’s decision was truly baffling.

Of the seven judges who heard the appeal, only three correctly held that freedom of association includes both a right to associate and a right to not associate. These three judges recognized that it’s just a matter of plain logic. If you are free to associate, you must also be free not to associate. That’s precisely what “free” means.

The remaining judges held that compulsory associations do not violate the Charter and that freedom of association “should not be expanded to protect the right not to associate.” Expanded? This implies that freedom from association is something other than a corollary of freedom of association. This view is incorrect. And it’s illogical.

In the end, the court had to bend the rules of good-reasoning to protect the Rand Formula. The word “freedom” necessarily implies choice. At a bare minimum, it must mean that individuals are free to choose to associate and free to choose not to associate. Yet the Lavigne decision protects the government’s constitutional authority to force individuals into involuntary associations. This is to confuse freedom with compulsion.

The real injustice in Quebec is not that tuition rates have been raised by a fraction. It’s that unions are supporting the protesting students using money involuntarily collected from unwilling Canadians.

Canada Should Repeal Its Blasphemy Law

It's time for Canada to repeal its prohibition on blasphemous libel.

Section 296 of the Criminal Code of Canada makes it an indictable offence to publish blasphemous libel.  Upon conviction, an accused is liable for up to two years of imprisonment.  Section 296 permits an accused the defence of “good faith” provided that “decent language” is used. 

296. (1) Every one who publishes a blasphemous libel is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

(2) It is a question of fact whether or not any matter that is published is a blasphemous libel.

(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section for expressing in good faith and in decent language, or attempting to establish by argument used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, an opinion on a religious subject.

It’s probably a safe bet that most Canadians do not know what the term “blasphemy” means, let alone that blasphemous libel is a criminal offence.  According to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, to blaspheme means to insult or show contempt or a lack of reverence for God or other things sacred.

Originally, blasphemous libel was specifically tied to publishing materials that brought the Christian religion into disrepute—presumably excluding other religions.  The courts held the prohibition to include any profane words vilifying God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Bible, or Christianity if it was done with the intent to shock or insult believers, or mislead the ignorant and unwary.

Arguably, the most recent decision on section 296 generalized the prohibition so that it may now be possible to blaspheme other religions as well.  But this has not been tested in court because the prohibition has fallen into disuse.

The first time I read this prohibition in the Criminal Code during law school, I found it surprising that Canada has any sort of law prohibiting blasphemy.  First, blasphemy is everywhere.  It is not difficult to find all sorts of published material that break this law—movies, music, books, magazines, video games, visual art, etc.  And second, any sort of prohibition on blasphemy strikes me as an unacceptable restriction on freedom of expression and one more potential foothold for tyranny.  Notice that the way that the prohibition is worded inevitably makes it function as a proxy for the personal and political views of the judiciary.  Perhaps "foothold for tyranny" is an understatement?

Fortunately, there have not been any blasphemous libel prosecutions in Canada since the 1930’s.  It is likely that section 296 is effectively dead even though it remains in the Criminal Code.

But being effectively dead is not truly dead.  The UK has had a similar prohibition with much the same story as Canada’s—it languished unused for a significant period of time.  Yet in the 1979 case of Whitehouse v. Lemon, Mary Whitehouse resurrected the UK’s blasphemous libel prohibition in a successful private prosecution.  The accused was convicted but did not have to serve the prison term.  By the way, the UK repealed its blasphemy law in 2008.

Aside from the important point that effectively dead laws are not guaranteed dead, there are other reasons to repeal section 296. 

First, the continued existence of a prohibition on blasphemy places Canada in an awkward and hypocritical position when it criticizes other countries of religious intolerance.  Remember the famous admonition to take the mote out of your own eye first?

And second, there is no certainty that the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression will offer any protection to an individual accused of blasphemous libel.  That’s an unanswered question that has never been tested in court.  Sadly, there are cases that refer to section 296 as a potentially justifiable violation of freedom of expression.  Also, there is no shortage of cases where the courts have deferred to the government and upheld restrictions on speech.  Trials are inherently uncertain and court decisions can often yield surprising results.

It’s probably best to repeal section 296 rather than assume that it will never be used in the future.

Damned if you do, damned if you don't

Canadians have a common law right to defend themselves, their family, and their property. This includes using reasonable force to protect oneself from physical harm. But this right – surely a fundamental, natural right immune from government interference – is being eroded and is under attack.

Ian Thomson, a Port Colbourne, Ontario resident, defended his life with a handgun – only to be charged later with three Criminal Code offences. He goes on trial January 30th and 31st.


PREVENTED HIS OWN MURDER... THEN CHARGED

Thomson, a target shooter and former firearms instructor, was awakened to the sound of shouted profanity and breaking glass early one August morning. Three masked men had come onto his land with Molotov cocktails and were firebombing his home while he slept. The highly agitated and aggressive intruders ignited Thomson’s front porch and dog kennel. They appeared bent on murder.

Thomson responded by doing two things: he phoned emergency services, and he retrieved a legally registered and properly secured firearm. Thomson exited his burning home and discharged the firearm two or three times to drive off his attackers.

Twenty-two minutes after being contacted, the police arrived. In the interim, Thomson dowsed the fires that the masked intruders had ignited. He had clearly prevented his own murder, yet Crown attorneys charged him with careless use of a firearm, careless storage of a firearm, and pointing a firearm.

There are at least three reasons why these charges are morally indefensible.

First, Thomson had no other viable alternative courses of action. He could not have awaited police assistance inside a burning home. He could not have negotiated with the intruders. He could not have fled unarmed without exposing himself to a potentially lethal attack and permitting the continued destruction of his home. Thomson took the most reasonable course of action. And he conducted himself in a manner that injured no one and damaged nothing.

Second, the Criminal Code provisions under which Thomson was charged clearly state that no criminal act has been committed if someone uses, stores, or points a firearm with a “lawful excuse”. The Criminal Code does not define “lawful excuse”, leaving the courts to decide what qualifies on a case-by-case basis. Surely even the Crown Attorneys who charged Thomson recognize that “lawful excuse” must include preventing your own murder.

Third, there is no question or doubt that Canadians have the right to defend themselves from violent attack. Contrary to popular wisdom, the State does not andshould not have a monopoly on the use of force. When you have a reasonable apprehension that someone is about to cause physical harm to you, your family, or your property, you have legal authority to use as much physical force as reasonably required to repel the attacker.

What is considered reasonable can only be determined by the particular facts and circumstances you are facing. This includes the nature and seriousness of the attack, the relative size and strength of the attackers, the number of attackers, and when and where the attack is occurring. Further, a person undergoing an attack is not expected to measure with exactitude or nicety the power of his blows.


BLAMING THE VICTIM

Now apply this to Ian Thomson. He was asleep at home alone. He was violently attacked by three masked men intent on burning his house down with him in it. He could have shot to kill, yet he chose a reasonable and morally acceptable course of action. He chose to deter and defend, and to cause no harm.

The Crown has dropped the careless use and pointing charges, but the fact that the charges were laid at all indicates that something has gone seriously awry. The charges effectively victimize Thomson. They imply that he should have remained idle while his life was threatened. This turns both common sense and our moral inclinations on their heads. Thomson was a victim, not a perpetrator. He suffered a violent attack only to face criminal sanction for defending himself. This shifts the moral blame to a victim who should not be expected to have done otherwise.

So Far So Good... or maybe not.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is 30 years old in 2012.

In Canadian law, the “Charter” is the first 34 sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. Broadly speaking, the Charter is a bill of rights recognizing individual rights and limiting the authority of the federal and provincial governments.

For example, section 2 of the Charter guarantees that everyone has the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and association.

Section 7 contains another important rights guarantee. This section recognizes that everyone has a right to liberty constrained only by the demands of justice—presumably the liberty of criminals can be constrained.

There was good reason to be optimistic in 1982 when the Charter was new—various portions were drafted to protect individual freedoms by limiting government authority. But in the 30 years following, the courts in Canada have continually done the opposite. Instead of the Charter protecting individual freedoms from overreaching governments, it has been given a government-promoting interpretation that negatively impacts upon individual freedoms.

In an article prepared for the C2C Journal, Karen Selick and I outline four portions of the Charter that have been given this government-promoting interpretation. You can read the article online here.

Here is a brief outline of the article.

• In the 1990 Canada v. Taylor decision, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) restricted the section 2(b) individual right to freedom of expression in order to preserve the hate speech provision in the Canadian Human Rights Act.
• In the 1991 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union decision, the SCC held that the section 2(d) freedom of association does not prohibit the government from forcing individuals to associate.
• In the 1988 R. v. Morgentaler decision, the SCC decided that the section 7 right to liberty grants individuals only a degree of autonomy when making decisions of fundamental personal importance, and that decisions of lesser significance could expect no constitutional protection.
• In the 2003 R. v. Malmo-Levine decision, the SCC decided that the government is free punish individuals for actions that cause no one any harm, despite the section 7 guarantee of individual liberty.

For the full discussion on each of these issues, go to the C2C Journal’s website and read the entire article. I think you will be convinced that the first 30 years of the Charter’s existence have yielded mixed results.


This appeared in the Canadian Constitution Foundation's blog in February 2012.

Intolerance in Quebec, Part Deux.

In February of 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decided that the Province of Quebec can force all school children—whether in public, private, or home schooling—to take a course on "Ethics and Religious Culture" (ERC).

• The SCC's decision can be read here.
• A QB government video on the ERC course can be watched here.
• I wrote a previous blog regarding the decision here.

Two Catholic parents in Quebec challenged the province's authority to force their children to study religion in school. Their argument was that the course implicitly taught that all religions were equally viable belief systems, and that this interfered with their religious duty to pass their faith on to their children. In the opinion of the parents, this interference violated their constitutional guarantee to freedom of religion contained in section 2(a) of the Charter.

There has been significant media interest in this case following the SCC's decision, but much of it has been flawed. The only legal analysis that can make sense of this issue is based upon individual autonomy and the constitutional right to be free from government intrusion.

One statist analysis has listed three reasons why QB should be prohibited from forcing all QB children to study the ERC course:

1. The State has no business teaching religion;
2. Religion is an should remain an intensely private matter; and
3. The risk of producing ignorance would be mitigated by a program focusing primarily on ethics and tolerance without religion.

Each of these reasons is (seriously) flawed.

Regarding the first, if the author is making a descriptive argument, there is no constitutional separation of Church and State in Canada. The Queen remains both the head of State and the head of the Church of England. And it is not (yet) possible to initiate a constitutional challenge on a lack of separation between Church and State. As a result, there is currently no constitutional bar against the State teaching religion. If the author is making a normative argument, it does not map onto the issue: the ERC course is forced on all public, private, and home schools. The issue is much broader than what the QB government is permitted to teach in public schools.

Regarding the second, religion is not an intensely private matter and few religious people would agree that it should be (or remain) an intensely private matter. Since it is not a private matter, what would the State need to do to make it one? It would have to use coercive force to silence and marginalize religious folks. That would amount to tyranny and would undermine individual freedom.

Regarding the third, the State has no legitimate role in changing the minds of religious people. "Mitigating ignorance" is a recipe for disaster. The State would have to decide who is ignorant and on what grounds. It would then have to choose the means for alleviating that ignorance. Finally, it would have to take active steps to compel people to change their minds. Again, this would amount to tyranny and would undermine individual freedom.

I recently wrote an Op-Ed on this case. It can be read here. My analysis is not statist. It focuses on individual liberty and the right of all Canadians to live free from state interference. In my opinion, this is the only way to make sense of what is so wrong with the ERC course.

This appeared in the Canadian Constitution Foundation's blog in February 2012.  

Steroids Users are Smarter than You

On October 22, 2010, the Calgary police seized 21 different anabolic steroids with a street value of $50,000.00 from a South East Calgary address and arrested Jordan James Cutts for possession for the purpose of trafficking and benefiting from the proceeds of crime.

Anabolic steroids have been given a lot of attention by the media in recent years.  From athletes cheating to enhance their performance, to American politicians addressing a supposed epidemic of use among youth, to the entrance of steroids into common parlance, it is difficult to find anybody who lacks an opinion on steroid use. 

Steroid talk is ubiquitous in modern dialogue, and not all of it is negative.  You might find yourself saying that a car is “on steroids” when you admire its performance.  You might say the same thing about your new computer, stereo, or smart phone.  Steroids are good.  They mean faster, stronger, and more powerful. 

Yet “on steroids” is also synonymous with cheating.  You only need to ask a sports fan about Ben Johnson, Mark McGwire, or even Arnold Schwarzenegger.  Steroid users are those devious cheaters trying to gain an unfair advantage over their competitors.  They are sneaky, dishonourable, and not to be admired, at least, not openly.

In 2005, the American Congress spent 8 of 151 days in session debating the use of anabolic steroids in sports.  That’s more time devoted to steroid use than to national healthcare.  The importance of this debate was encapsulated by Joe Biden. “This is about values.  It’s about our culture.  It’s about who we define ourselves to be.”  Of course, the great concern was that young athletes would emulate the behaviour of their heroes.  This would cause an epidemic among youth.  It would wreck their health, their relationships, and ultimately, their character.  These young athletes would never learn the value of hard work, honesty, and integrity.  This could destroy an entire generation of young Americans.

Even more dire, “on steroids” can evoke images of illicit drug use, dingy locker rooms, and clandestine meetings.  Rightly or wrongly, it is widely assumed that steroids are addictive.  They produce “roid-rage”.  They grotesquely distort users’ bodies and minds, and destroy health, relationships, and family.  Ultimately, steroid users are treacherous, anti-social meat-heads, who are the intellectual companions of Neanderthals.

These connotations are a strange mix of the desirable, dishonourable, and the dangerous.  Yet for all the opinions held by the public, very little is known regarding who is using anabolic steroids.  And this might surprise you.

Nearly 3 million Americans have used anabolic steroids for non-medical purposes.  For the most part, these Americans are not naïve youth enamoured with steroid-using role models.  They are not athletes secretly using steroids in contravention of sporting rules.  And they are certainly not addicts making drug deals in dark alleys.  The average steroid user is a much less likely candidate. 

A study published in 2007 in the Journal of the International Society of Sports Nutrition found that the typical steroid user in America is a highly-educated, gainfully employed professional of approximately 30 years of age.  This typical steroid-user earns a higher-than-average income, is not involved in organized sport, and is motivated by the desire to improve health through physical activity and steroids.

This completely undercuts the popular ideas regarding steroid use.  Speaking generally, steroid users are not impressionable youth—they are young adults fully capable of making informed decisions about their own health.  Steroid users are not devious cheaters—they are not involved with organized sport and are not bound by the rules of any sporting body.  Steroid users are not less intelligent—they are professionals with more than average education.  And steroid users bear little resemblance to addicts—they are seeking to improve their health not feeding a habit.

If the Canadian experience is similar, it makes me wonder if I know any of Jordan James Cutts’s customers.  Maybe I see them at the gym.  Maybe I talk with them at the water cooler at work.  In any event, it seems that steroid users are among the best and brightest of our peers and the stereotypes are wrong.